Seven years later, we have been able to collect additional documents and materials as well as obtain information from sources whom An shared intimate connections with about events in the lifetime of this “perfect spy.”

Thus, the launch of this new introspective series will provide readers with an opportunity to review the events that occurred in An’s career, as we strive to “decode” the man by analyzing him in the context of the relationships he built over time – both with those whom he had befriended and those whom he secretly fought against.

We hope that the series will help to erase the misconceptions and perspectives that may have derived from Western media and publications’ reporting on An and provide a nuanced view of the man and his lifetime achievements.

Chapter 1: The advantage of the English language

How Pham Xuan An began his spying career has been mentioned in many books.

Starting out as an employee of Caltex oil firm, An later worked for the French Customs Office in Saigon Port where he “made copies of almost all documents concerning the transport of military supplies, weapons and equipment of French troops” to send to his commanders and gained seminal experience in intelligence work.

When the resistance war against the French army was coming to an end, An was ordered to “shift focus to a new target, but not ignore the old one.”

The turning point in his undercover life came when the ruling authority in South Vietnam was being transferred from the French to the Americans.

The new objective involved acquiring a military position with the new regime.

Before the Geneva Convention was signed, An’s commander Pham Ngoc Thach had asked him to “try to dodge the draft, but if drafted, to climb [in rank] as high up as battalion commander.”

An’s cousin, Captain Pham Xuan Giai, then served as the Bureau 5’s head in the Vietnam National Army’s General Staff.

Giai had close relationships with Chief of General Staff, General Nguyen Van Hinh, and Head of the Counterintelligence Bureau 6, Major Tran Dinh Lan.

Realizing an auspicious opportunity, An contacted his cousin, who promised to find him a job in Bureau 5.

Before he left the customs office, An managed to fill his previous role with Tu An, who continued his work until the Geneva Convention was signed in July 1954.

The General Staffs Bureau 5 was responsible for military training and psychological warfare; it was also referred to as the Military Training Bureau.

In April 1954, Hinh recruited An to work in the bureau in the rank of staff sergeant.

An subsequently became Giai’s secretary to support daily operations.

When the Americans began their intervention in Vietnam to assist French troops, their officials became involved in military matters and established relations with General Staff personnel to advise on enhancing the army’s defensive capacity.

Captain Giai was one of a few local officers fluent in English because he had been previously trained in psychological warfare at Fort Bragg, California.

He was responsible for working directly with American Colonel Edward Lansdale, who played a major role in setting up and fortifying Ngo Dinh Diem’s southern regime.

Giai delegated An, who was also adept at speaking English, to contact Lansdale’s lower-ranked officers such as captains Rufus Philips, Roderick and Sharp.

Although An could not initially form a direct relationship with Lansdale, he was able to make friends with several US officers and began to learn the American way of doing things.

After the signing of the Geneva Convention in 1954, France and the US agreed that the US would train and reconstruct the “national army” [South Vietnamese Army] according to its standards.

A joint Franco-American Training Relations and Instructions Mission (TRIM), previously set up in February 1955, was replaced by CATO (Combined Army Training Organization) under the authority of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam (MAAGV) in June 1956.

In October 1955, the US had proposed that the Ngo Dinh Diem regime reform its armed forces by first grouping existing infantry battalions into six light infantry divisions, which would be trained under American oversight at the Thu Duc Military Training School.

An was the only non-commissioned officer who followed the “National Army” officers to translate for American advisors.

Later, thanks to his deft ability to “know how to work with Americans,” An was appointed to facilitate smooth communication between Bureau 5 and CATO because the previously responsible officer had been rejected for being “influenced too heavily by the French.” Despite his low rank, An’s new post afforded him the opportunity to attend discussions about training programs and selection of officers for overseas training.

At that time, CATO was planning to train commandos and infiltrate them into the north to conduct sabotage activities.

The problem with the plan was that most Vietnamese officers in the Military Training Bureau opposed the scheme.

The officers had been trained by the French army, and thus were used to working according to the French way.

Most did not agree with the American-style training methods.

An, who had already relayed the intents of the infiltration plan to his superiors in the north, stepped up to serve as a go-between for Bureau 5 and the American officers.

He knew he would be sidelined, and hence barred from conducting spying activities for the north if he failed to convince either side to reach a tentative agreement.

When US chief advisor Lieutenant Colonel George Melvin asked An for his opinion on the plan, he replied that the ideas were “great and new” but “I’m afraid the Vietnamese officers will not accept them easily because they think there’s no point in sending commandos to the north now that we have signed a truce.”

Melvin slapped the table and said, “I’m sorry you’re just a staff sergeant. If you were an officer, I would ask [Defense Minister] Tran Trung Dung to promote you to chief of the Military Training Bureau.”

An responded, “Gosh, don’t say so. If my bosses heard they could banish me to [the military demarcation zone of] Ben Hai. Let me try to persuade them.”

Melvin happily promised, “If you succeed, I will throw a banquet for you.”

An then requested a meeting with Major General Tran Van Don, who was then the chief of general staff.

He told Don that rejection of the commando training plan “will cause not only Melvin but also [MAAG chief] Lieutenant General [Samuel] Williams to lose face.

“You should permit the approval of this plan to help them save face, after that we’ll find a way to delay its implementation,” said An.

“Someone else may already fill their posts by the time things are set in motion.”

Don thought it was a wise move, so he ordered the Military Training Bureau to approve the plan.

As forecast by An, the scheme was not carried out until 1960.

An then phoned to ask Melvin to “prepare money for dining out.” Instead of eating out, however, Melvin invited An to his home where he organized a feast with other guests, including Lansdale, Philips, General Williams, Filipino Colonel Benson.

It was at that point that An started to build a close relationship with Lansdale.

By Hoang Hai Van